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Walter	Benjamin’s	Berliner	Kindheit	um	1900:	Longing,	Enchantment	and	the	Material	Subject					Abstract:	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	offer	an	interpretation	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	
Berliner	Kindheit	um	1900	[Berlin	Childhood	Around	1900].	Exploring	the	style	and	the	content	of	Benjamin’s	text,	both	of	which	portray	the	world	of	his	childhood	as	a	place	of	enchantment,	I	suggest	that	Benjamin	creates	in	this	text	a	conception	of	the	self	as	displaced	into	the	surrounding	material	world.	I	argue	that,	in	doing	this,	Benjamin	seeks	to	explore	the	materiality	of	the	subject	and	erase	its	subjection	to	time,	creating	a	self	that	is	constituted	only	by	space.	I	seek	to	show	that	this	is	part	of	Benjamin’s	strategy	of	exploring	a	decentered	conception	of	agency.	In	all	this,	I	suggest,	Benjamin	converts	his	own	childhood	into	a	work	of	art	in	which	there	is	a	longing	for	redemption	that	cannot	finally	be	achieved	but	that	expresses	an	important	understanding	of	the	truth	of	a	human	life.		Key	words:	enchantment;	self;	agency;	materiality;	art;	redemption.					1.	In	what	is	probably	the	best	known	passage	in	his	On	the	Concept	of	History	Walter	Benjamin	speaks	of	‘the	angel	of	history’:		 His	face	is	turned	toward	the	past.	Where	we	perceive	a	chain	of	events,	he	sees	one	single	catastrophe	which	keeps	piling	wreckage	upon	wreckage	and	hurls	it	in	front	of	his	feet.	The	angel	would	like	to	stay,	awake	the	dead	and	make	whole	what	has	been	smashed.	But	a	storm	is	blowing	from	Paradise;	it	has	got	caught	in	his	wings	with	such	violence	that	the	angel	can	no	longer	close	them.	This	storm	irresistibly	propels	him	into	the	future	to	which	his	back	is	turned,	while	the	pile	of	debris	grows	skyward.	This	storm	is	what	we	call	progress.	(Benjamin	2007	[1955],	258)		This	immensely	tragic	vision	of	history,	belied	by	the	intense	and	peculiar	consolatory	power	of	Benjamin’s	style	of	writing,	is	clearly	intended	to	apply	to	human	history	as	such.	But	it	applies	as	well	to	the	history	of	any	given	individual.	Benjamin	is	acutely	aware	of	the	endless,	unstoppable	deterioration	to	which	any	given	human	life	is	exposed,	which	any	given	human	life	is,	the	way	in	which,	as	one	looks	back	over	one’s	life,	one	cannot	but	see	a	trail	of	destruction	unmitigated	by	any	good	one	might	have	been	able	to	achieve	or	provide	for	others,	as	if	one	needed	redemption	not	from	this	or	that,	but	as	such,	as	if	one	had	committed	some	kind	of	error	somewhere,	one	knows	not	what	or	where	exactly,	which	one	then	spins	out	or	unfurls	in	one’s	life,	whether	one	wishes	to	or	not.	That,	at	any	rate,	is	how	Benjamin	saw	things	and	saw	his	own	life,	as	Hannah	Arendt	(Benjamin	2007,	7)	
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points	out.	We	live,	he	says	elsewhere	in	his	text	on	history,	in	an	Ausnahmezustand,	a	state	of	emergency.	He	may	have	had	in	mind	as	he	wrote	this	Baudelaire’s	vision	of	human	life	as	a	hospital	in	which	we	each	mistakenly	suppose	we	shall	be	better	off	by	moving	about,	but	remain	in	the	hospital	nonetheless,	as	if	in	an	emergency	ward	where	the	doctors	can	do	little	for	us	but	give	us	the	illusion	that	they	might	cure	us.		An	angel	is	a	figure	of	redemption	-	even	if	he	fails	to	redeem.	In	this	essay	I	wish	to	explore	Benjamin’s	Berliner	Kindheit	um	1900	(Berlin	Childhood	Around	1900),1	his	autobiography	or	memoir	of	his	childhood,	and	offer	an	interpretation	that	situates	Benjamin	as	one	who	is	seeking	redemption	in	or	for,	who	is	seeking	to	redeem,	his	life.	Redemption	would	be,	in	this	context,	roughly,	the	achieved	sense	that	some	moment	of	life,	some	period	of	one’s	existence,	had	achieved	a	kind	of	plenitude	that	meant	that,	for	its	sake,	all	the	errors	and	confusions	of	one’s	life,	all	the	mistakes	and	the	idiocies,	all	the	pain	inflicted	and	suffered,	were	worthwhile,	had	to	be	accepted	for	the	sake	of	that	redemptive	moment.2	In	exploring	this	thought,	I	wish	to	do	what	I	can	to	bring	out	what	is	so	peculiar	about	this	text,	its	dreamlike,	hallucinatory,	magical,	incantatory	quality,	for	this	quality	is	central	to	the	presentation	of	Benjamin’s	childhood	as	the	redemptive	moment	in	question.	And	this	text	is	the	product	of	a	mind	at	once	spiritual	and	yet	deeply	corporeal,	like	that	of	an	angel	and	yet	also	like	that	of	Virginia	Woolf’s	Neville	in	The	Waves,	a	‘mind	like	the	tongue	of	an	ant-eater,	rapid,	dextrous,	glutinous’.	In	the	memoir	of	his	childhood	Abschied	von	den	Eltern	(available	in	English	as	Leavetaking)	–	in	many	ways	a	reply,	an	act	of	homage	to,	and	envious	glance	at,	Benjamin’s	Kindheit3	-	Peter	Weiss	(1974	[1964],	14)	says	that	he	had,	as	a	child,	‘a	small	toy	truck	filled	with	miniature	boxes,	and	the	thought	of	these	boxes	[now]	evokes	a	thick,	heavy	feeling	in	the	roof	of	my	mouth’.	That	is	just	the	sensation	one	has	on	reading	Benjamin’s	text,	and	it	is	provoked	in	the	same	way	in	the	confrontation,	through	memory,	of	present	reflection	and	childhood	experience:	one’s	mouth	feels	clammy	and	full,	as	if	one	had	a	spoonful	of	syrup	to	swallow,	and	one’s	body	feels	heavy	and	warm,	lethargic	and	indolent,	as	if	the	warmth	of	the	summer	sun	were	bearing	down	on	one	through	the	trees	in	the	heat	of	the	afternoon,	the	dappled	light	playing	across	one’s	skin.	We	are	‘in	the	electric	heat/Hypnotised’:	Benjamin’s	prose	here	has	a	hypnotic	quality	that	can	make	one	drowsy.	It	is	this	that	is	central	to	this	text	and	there	can	be	absolutely	no	doubt	that	this	is	the	experience	for	which	Benjamin	was	seeking	in	writing	his	memoir	as	he	does.	It	is	as	if	everything	about	him	in	his	childhood	evoked	the	feeling	of	heaviness	and	thickness	in	his	mouth,	and	this	sensation	is	what	he	wants	the	reader	to	experience.			2.	Benjamin’s	Kindheit	has	a	complicated	history.	It	grew	out	of	an	earlier,	abandoned	work,	Berliner	Chronik,	and	was	started	around	August	1932.	But	Benjamin	wrote	the	introduction	in	1938	after	he	had	revised,	and	shortened,	the	main	bulk	of	the	text.	Between	1932	and	1938,	indeed,	he	produced	at	least	four	versions	of	the	text.	He	failed	in	his	efforts	to	get	the	work	published	as	a	book,	although	he	did	publish	some	parts	of	it	in	newspapers	and	in	Thomas	Mann’s	journal	Maß	und	Wert.	The	first	book	version	was	published	under	the	auspices	of	
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Theodor	Adorno	in	1950.	A	later	version	in	1972	increased	the	length	of	the	previous	publication	by	adding	material	that	Benjamin	had	conceived	as	part	of	the	text	but	had	been	left	out	of	the	1950	edition.	But	in	1982	the	so-called	‘final	version’,	with	an	arrangement	by	Benjamin	himself,	was	discovered	in	Paris.	This	was	published	in	1989	in	Benjamin’s	Gesammelte	Schriften,	and	for	this	essay	I	have	used	the	version	of	this	published	in	2006	by	Suhrkamp	(Benjamin	2006a).	This	text	also	contains	various	fragments	from	earlier	versions.	The	most	readily	available	English	edition	that	I	have	consulted	(Benjamin	2006b)	deviates	from	the	Suhrkamp	text	in	some	respects	in	its	arrangement.	There	is,	in	any	case,	no	definitive	version	of	the	text.		Part	of	what	makes	the	text	so	open	to	taking	on	various	arrangements	is	the	fact	that	it	in	no	sense	offers	a	more	or	less	linear,	narrative	ordering	or	account	of	Benjamin’s	childhood.	In	the	abandoned	Berliner	Chronik,	he	writes	(Benjamin	2016,	23):	‘Memory	is	not	an	instrument	for	exploring	the	past,	but	its	theatre’.	The	thought	is	not	entirely	clear	but	I	take	it	that	Benjamin	is	suggesting	that	there	is	no	hope	at	all	–	as	one	might	naïvely	suppose	-	of		unearthing	the	experienced	personal	past	and	relating	it	in	any	way	that	simply	or	straightforwardly	represents	it	as	it	was,	somehow	pristine	in	the	integrity	of	what	it	was	at	the	time.	Benjamin	is	surely	right	about	that,4	and	this		accounts,	at	least	in	part,	for	the	approach	he	adopts	here.	
	He	makes	his	method	clear	in	a	comment	in	the	very	first	section,	Loggien,	‘Loggias’	when,	speaking	of	the	air	of	the	inner	courtyards	into	which	Berlin’s	loggias	look,	he	says	that	this	
	 air	has	forever	remained	intoxicating	for	me.	I	believe	that	a	residue	[Beisatz]	of	this	air	was	present	around	the	vineyards	of	Capri	where	I	held	my	lover	close	to	me;	and	it	is	just	this	air	that	envelopes	the	images	and	allegories	that	dominate	my	thinking	as	the	caryatids	on	the	heights	of	the	loggias	dominate	the	courtyards	of	Berlin’s	West	End.	(Benjamin	2006a,	11)	
	Past	and	present,	adult	longing	and	childhood	memory,	adult	memory	and	childhood	longing,	the	material	and	the	spiritual	(as	all	erotic	love	is),	thinking	and	feeling,	sentiment	and	reflection	are	fused	here	in	a	way	that	revels	in	the	impossibility	of	full	comprehension,	philosophical	dissection,	analytic	insight.	Or	again,	writing	of	the	winter	mornings	and	characteristically	projecting	himself	outwards	into	objects	–	‘the	winter	morning	would	entrust	me	to	the	safekeeping	of	the	things	in	my	room’	(Benjamin	2006a,	29)	–	he	says	that	the	nursemaid,	waking	him	at	half	past	six	in	the	morning,	would	place	an	apple	in	the	stove	by	his	bed.	Opening	the	door	of	the	stove	to	see	the	it	slowly	cooking,	Benjamin	tells	us	that	the	apple	was	on	a	‘journey	through	the	dark	land	of	the	oven’s	heat	from	which	it	had	wrought	the	fragrance	of	all	the	things	that	the	day	held	in	store	for	me’	(Benjamin	2006a,	30).		 And	so	it	was	not	surprising	that	whenever	I	warmed	my	hands	on	its	shining	cheeks	I	was	overcome	by	a	hesitation	preventing	me	from	biting	into	it.	I	
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sensed	that	the	fugitive	knowledge	[Kund]	that	it	brought	in	its	smell	could	only	too	easily	slip	away	from	me	on	the	way	to	my	tongue.	(Benjamin	2006a,	30)		Whatever	else	we	say	about	this	account	of	the	winter	morning,	and	however	sensitive	we	imagine	Benjamin	as	a	boy	to	have	been,	there	can	be	little	doubt,	I	think,	that	we	see	here	his	conception	of	memory	at	work,	since,	at	the	very	least,	the	intense	specificity	of	the	feelings	Benjamin	suggests	the	apple	provoked	in	him	is	of	a	kind	that	can	only	come	with	adult	knowledge,	however	powerful	the	sentiment	in	the	child,	and	however	precious	he	might	be.	I	am	not,	of	course,	in	any	sense	denying	he	loved	the	apple	and	all	the	associated	feelings	of	the	winter	morning	and	the	like.	But	it	is	the	adult	reconstructing	the	child’s	experience	that	we	have	here,	not	the	attempt	to	get	at	what	it	was	like	for	the	child	in	a	way	that	might	respond	to,	or	capture,	the	child’s	inchoate	sense	of	things,	which	always	resists	the	precision	with	which	the	adult	seeks	to	articulate	things.		Another,	perhaps	even	more	telling,	example	of	the	same	inflection	is	to	be	found	in	the	passage	Schmetterlingsjagd,	‘Butterfly	Hunt’.	‘The	old	law	of	hunters	began	to	dominate	us’,	he	says,	referring	to	his	relationship	with	the	butterfly	of	which	he	was	in	pursuit.		 [T]he	more	I	pressed	myself	close	to	the	animal	in	all	the	fibres	of	my	being	[ich	selbst	in	allen	Fibern	mich	dem	Tier	anschmiegte],	the	more	butterfly-like	I	became	in	my	inner	being,	the	more	the	butterfly	took	on,	in	all	it	did,	the	colours	of	human	resolution,	and	finally	it	was	as	if	capturing	it	was	the	price	that	had	to	be	paid	for	my	reconquering	my	human	existence	[meines	
Menschendaseins	wieder	habhaft	werden	könne].	(Benjamin	2006a,	20-1)		The	particular	quality	of	Benjamin’s	experience	here	becomes	especially	clear	by	comparing	it	with,	say,	Orwell’s	comment	(Orwell,	1970	[1952],	18)	about	his	boyhood	trips	to	go	butterfly	hunting	away	from	his	detested	boarding	school:		 And	oh,	the	joy	of	those	occasional	expeditions!	The	ride	of	two	or	three	miles	on	a	lonely	little	branch	line,	the	afternoon	of	charging	to	and	fro	with	large	green	nets,	the	beauty	of	the	enormous	dragon	flies	which	hovered	over	the	tops	of	the	grasses,	the	sinister	killing-bottle	with	its	sickly	smell,	and	then	tea	in	the	parlour	of	a	pub	with	large	slices	of	pale-coloured	cake!		One	thing	that	make	Orwell’s	prose	so	much	more	direct	that	Benjamin’s	is	his	use	of	exclamation	marks	to	convey	the	thrill	of	it	all;	another	is	the	simplicity	of	his	writing,	which	gives	his	text	a	certain	boyhood	innocence	that	is	utterly	lacking	in	Benjamin’s	memoir.	Benjamin’s	vocabulary	and	prose	style	–	for	example,	his	grammatical	choices	–	gives	his	text	a	metaphysical	flavour,	as	if	each	thing	and	event	carried	with	it	a	metaphysical	significance	which,	if	one	could	only	get	it	right,	would	allow	one,	as	it	were,	to	settle	things	once	and	for	all,	as	if	behind	all	appearance	there	lurked	the	thing-in-itself	about	which	one	could	speak	after	all	
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and	which	would	solve	the	enigma	of	human	existence.	In	Orwell’s	hands	(and	mouth)	cake	is	just	cake;	for	Benjamin,	cake	would	be,	as	was	his	apple,	laden	with	a	spiritual	and	metaphysical	significance	that	only	the	adult	mind	could	experience	as	Benjamin	presents	it.			3.	Benjamin’s	text	consists	of	a	number	of	what	he	called	Denkbilder,	‘thought	images’	(or	‘thought	pictures’;	‘thought	figures’),	isolated	fragments,	images	that	surged	up	for	him	in	thinking	about	this	childhood,	and	in	which	he	appears	as	a	protagonist	only	indirectly,	and	sometimes	opaquely,	since	the	main	interest	is	in	places	and	things,	in	particular	moments	or	sensations,	in	specific	locations	or	times.	Indeed,	Benjamin’s	strategy	throughout	is	to	plunge	himself	into	the	things	around	him	and	dissolve	or	dissipate	himself	into	locations	or	sensations	in	the	spirit	of	his	comment	that	‘[o]ne	forms	an	image	of	a	person	and	of	his	nature	[Wesensart]	from	his	place	of	residence	and	from	the	neighbourhood	in	which	he	lives…’	(Benjamin	2006a,	43).	He	is	explicit	about	this	strategy:		 Early	on	I	learnt	to	clothe	myself	in	words,	which	were	actually	clouds.	The	gift	of	recognizing	similarities	is	really	nothing	but	a	weak	residue	of	the	old	compulsion	to	become	like	others	and	behave	in	the	same	way.	Words	exercised	this	compulsion	over	me.	Not	those	that	made	me	resemble	well-behaved	children,	but	apartments,	furniture,	clothes.	I	was	distorted	[entstellt]	by	my	similarity	to	all	that	surrounded	me.	(Benjamin	2006a,	59)		Or	again,	he	tells	us	that	when	he	went	to	his	customary	hiding	places	he	would	become	one	with	the	hiding	place:		 The	child	that	stands	behind	the	doorway	becomes	himself	something	white	that	flutters,	a	ghost.	The	dining	table	under	which	he	has	crawled	turns	him	into	the	wooden	idol	of	the	temple,	where	the	four	carved	legs	are	four	pillars.	And	behind	a	door	he	is	himself	a	door…	(Benjamin	2006a,	61)		And	the	same	move	is	repeated	when	Benjamin	speaks	of	his	love	of	the	colours	of	the	stained-glass	windows	of	an	old	summerhouse	in	the	garden:	‘Whenever	I	passed	from	one	pane	to	the	other	inside	I	was	transformed:	I	took	on	the	colours	of	the	landscape’	(Benjamin	2006a,	70).		The	Benjamin	we	encounter	in	this	text	is	one	marvellously,	mysteriously	present	because	so	displaced,	displaced	into	the	telephone	installed	in	his	parents’	home,	the	zoo,	the	Siegessäule	[Victory	Column],	the	market…	It	is	not	simply,	as	Susan	Sontag	(Benjamin,	1979,	8)	has	it,	that	‘Benjamin	projected	himself,	his	temperament,	into	all	his	major	subjects’,	since,	though	that	is	true,	it	fails	to	get	at	the	intensely	corporeal,	bodily	feel	of	this	text,	in	writer	and	reader	alike.		4.	Benjamin	tells	us	that	he	adopts	the	approach	of	displacement	because	he	wanted	to	inoculate	himself	against	his	longing,	‘to	hold	it	in	check	through	insight	into	the	necessary	social	irretrievability	of	the	past,	not	the	contingently	biographical’	
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(Benjamin	2006a,	9).	But	the	book	is	full	of	longing	and	of	the	contingently	biographical	–	although,	as	I	have	noted,	not	at	all	the	biographical	that	the	literal-minded	might	seek:	‘I	did	this,	then	that	happened...’.	That	is	one	thing	that	makes	it	so	worthwhile	reading,	since	it	is	also	and	at	the	same	time	full	of	insight	into	the	social	and	its	loss,	its	irretrievability.	Every	object,	place,	person	described	here	speaks	of	some	longing,	some	personal	yearning	or	nostalgia	made	all	the	more	acute	because	the	social	conditions	that	made	the	object	possible	are	being	swept	away	as	Benjamin	writes	in	the	1930s.	This	longing	makes	of	the	text	a	dream,	sensual	and	erotic.	The	thick,	heavy	feeling	of	the	body	is	that	of	the	erotic	encounter,	the	body	fulfilled,	but,	as	in	the	deepest	such	encounters,	left	with	a	sense	of	something	just	out	of	reach,	some	moment	of	redemptive	bliss	that	would	put	an	end	to	any	further	erotic	desire	the	body	may	contain.	Desire	can	only	be	satisfied	in	its	failure	at	being	satisfied,	at	the	moment	when	its	redemption	is	frustrated.	This	comes	out	clearly	in	a	passage	entitled	Der	Strumpf,	‘The	Sock’,	where	Benjamin	writes	of	a	cupboard	in	which,	underneath	piles	of	clothes,	he	would	find	his	socks	that	were	in	a	‘traditional	manner	rolled	up	and	turned	inside	out.	Each	pair	had	the	appearance	of	a	small	pocket’.		 Nothing	exceeded	the	pleasure	I	had	in	sinking	my	hand	as	deeply	as	possible	into	its	interior.	I	did	this	on	account	of	its	warmth.	It	was	‘what	was	proffered	[das	Mitgebrachte]’,	rolled	up	inside,	that	I	always	held	in	my	hand	and	that	drew	me	into	the	depths.	When	I	had	encircled	it	with	my	fist	and,	so	far	as	I	could,	come	into	possession	of	the	soft,	woollen	mass,	the	second	part	of	the	game	began:	that	of	the	unveiling.	For	now	I	set	about	unravelling	‘what	was	proffered’	from	its	woollen	pocket.	I	pulled	it	ever	closer	to	me	until	I	fell	into	consternation:	I	had	pulled	out	‘what	was	proffered’,	but	‘the	pocket’	in	which	it	had	lain	was	no	longer	there.	I	could	not	get	enough	of	testing	this	movement	[Vorgang].	(Benjamin	2006a,	58)		The	erotic	charge	–	the	male	erotic	charge	-	of	this	game	is	unmistakeable.5	Desire	here	is	inflected	as	erotic	desire	that	achieves	its	goal	as	a	moment	of	consternation:	the	moment	of	orgasm	is	a	moment	of	disappointment	–	not	because	it	is	never	as	good	as	it	promises	to	be,	but	precisely	because	it	is	a	moment	of	ecstasy.	I	think	Benjamin	is	latching	onto	that	dimension	of	human	sexuality,	of	erotic	love,	in	which	its	ecstasy	is	unbearable	for	human	beings	because,	in	its	perfection,	it	lifts	them	beyond	what	they	can	bear	in	all	their	frailty	and	weakness	and	so	takes	them	beyond	their	own	condition.	Hence	the	ancient	thought	that	the	true	apotheosis	of	sexual	love	is	to	be	found	in	death.		It	is	not	just	erotic	desire	that	is	represented	here	as	fulfilled	in	its	frustration.	In	the	section	on	Das	Fieber,	‘The	Fever’,	Benjamin	writes	of	being	often	ill	as	a	child	and	being	confined	to	bed.	He	suggests	that	this	explains	his		 tendency	to	see	all	that	matters	to	me	approach	me	from	a	distance	as	the	hours	approached	my	sickbed.	Hence	it	is	that	I	miss	my	greatest	pleasure	when	travelling	if	I	cannot	wait	for	a	long	time	for	the	train	at	the	station;	and	
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this	is	also	why	giving	gifts	has	become	a	passion	with	me:	for	I,	the	giver,	anticipate	in	advance	the	surprise	of	those	who	receive.	Indeed,	my	need	in	waiting	to	anticipate	that	which	comes	to	me	-	as	a	sick	person	is	supported	by	the	pillows	that	he	has	behind	his	back	–	had	the	result	that,	later	on,	women	appeared	all	the	more	beautiful	to	me	the	longer	and	the	more	consolingly	I	had	to	wait	for	them.	(Benjamin	2006a,	37-8)		This	kind	of	thing	is	a	pattern	that	repeats	itself	in	the	text:	desire	is	satisfied	when	its	fulfilment	is	withheld,	when	it	is	experienced	as	deferred	or	frustrated.	This	is	Benjamin’s	strategy	of	‘inoculated	longing’:	desire	comes	to	terms	with	its	own	non-fulfilment	and,	in	doing	so,	is	left	behind	the	subject,	Benjamin	no	longer	burdened.	Yet	the	text	as	a	whole,	so	full	of	longing,	hardly	convinces	the	reader	that	it	has	been	inoculated.		5.	The	world	Benjamin	describes	in	his	book	is	thoroughly	enchanted:	it	is	a	world	filled	with	magic.	Everything	is	what	it	is	in	itself	and	something	else,	something	of	spiritual	and	metaphysical	significance,	and	gods	and	goddesses	inhabit	this	world:	the	city	god	of	Berlin,	who	begins	in	the	loggias:	‘He	remains	so	present	there	that	nothing	transitory	can	hold	its	own	compared	to	him’	(Benjamin	2006a,	13);	the	god	of	the	Markthalle,	the	Market	Hall,	‘who	himself	threw	their	wares	into	their	lap	[that	of	‘the	priestesses	of	the	venal	Ceres’]:	berries,	shellfish,	mushrooms,	lumps	of	meat	and	cabbage…’	(Benjamin	2006a,	36);	and	the	cold	goddesses	of	the	swimming	pool	who	jealously	cut	off	the	swimmers	from	the	outer	world	(Benjamin	2006a,	57).	But	there	is	no	structured	cosmology	here,	as	it	were,	an	incipient	theology,	still	less	a	cosmology	that	Benjamin	shares	with	his	peers,	who	are	altogether	less	real	in	this	text	that	the	gods	by	which	Benjamin	takes	himself	to	be	confronted.	Nor	is	there	any	obvious	connection	with	Judaic	cosmology.		Benjamin’s	is	a	private	vision	even	as	it	seeks	to	be,	is,	a	vision	of	an	historical	epoch:	here	we	have	a	subjectivity	fully	displayed,	but	mastered,	claiming	attention	as	more	than		a	personal	obsession	precisely	through	the	style	is	evinces.	Thus,	speaking	of	the	loggias,	Benjamin	writes:		 Since	I	was	a	child	the	loggias	have	changed	less	than	other	rooms.	But	that	is	not	the	only	reason	they	are	close	to	me.	It	is	rather	a	matter	of	the	consolation	[des	Trostes	wegen]	that	lies	in	their	uninhabitability	for	him	who	has	no	longer	anywhere	to	live	[nicht	mehr	recht	zum	Wohnen	kommt].	They	are	the	limit	of	the	Berliner’s	abode.	Berlin	–	the	god	of	the	city	himself	–	begins	in	them…In	his	protection	place	and	time	come	into	their	own	and	find	each	other.	(Benjamin	2006a,	13)		Benjamin	skirts	his	self-pity	here,	looking	at	it,	as	it	were,	out	of	the	corner	of	his	eye,	in	pursuit	of	consolation.	The	move	is	completed	in	the	same	gesture	that	masters	his	subjectivity:	it	is	the	move	from	his	closeness	to	the	loggias	to	what	the	
Berliner	experiences.		
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Benjamin	is	evasive	too	about	this	self-pity	in	the	introductory	comments,	when,	speaking	of	the	images	of	his	metropolitan	childhood,	he	says	this:		 No	traditional	forms	await	them	yet	as	do	those		-	in	accordance	with	a	feeling	for	nature	–	that	have	been	available	for	centuries	for	the	memories	of	a	childhood	spent	in	the	country…	I	hope	that	in	them	it	is	at	least	clear	how	much	the	person	spoken	of	here	later	renounced	the	security	that	was	the	destiny	of	his	childhood	[seiner	Kindheit	beschieden	gewesen	war].	(Benjamin	2006a,	9-10)		It	is,	in	fact,	not	at	all	obvious	that	Benjamin’s	hope	is	justified:	anyone	reading	his	memoir,	and	without	other	information	about	him,	might	be	forgiven	for	having	no	idea	that	the	security	he	had	as	a	child	was	precisely	what	was	lacking	in	his	adult	life,	shambolic,	awkward,	self-destructive	as	it	was,	what	with	the	failure	of	his	
Habilitationsschrift,	his	messy	financial	relationship	with	his	father,	his	failed	marriage,	his	dissociation	of	sensibility	(his	wife	commented	at	one	point	that	he	was	just	‘brains	and	sex’6),	his	inability	to	finish	projects	or	get	them	published	as	he	wished	when	they	were	finished,	and	his	suicide	that,	it	seems,	could	easily	have	been	avoided	had	he	arrived	at	the	Franco-Spanish	border	just	one	day	later.	As	Hannah	Arendt	(Benjamin	2007,	6-10)	points	out,	the	‘bungler’	is	a	key	figure	that	haunts	Benjamin.		Or	perhaps	he	might.	In	a	sense,	it	is	just	the	oneiric,	intoxicated	quality	of	Benjamin’s	childhood	as	we	find	it	here	that	will	make	one	think	that	all	is	not	as	it	seems.	Where,	for	example,	are	the	forms	of	boredom	and	frustration	typical	of	moments	of	any	childhood	in	Benjamin’s	account?	Certainly	the	boy	seems	isolated,	deeply	turned	in	on	himself.	But	there	is	no	anger	here,	no	rage,	very	little	of	the	typical	forms	of	stubbornness	or	demandingness	characteristic	of	childhood.	All	is	presented	as	if	held	fast	at	the	bottom	of	a	layer	of	amber	through	which	it	is	seen,	the	colour	lending	to	it	a	melancholy	glow	of	life	held	fixed	for	inspection.		But	this	is	just	what	Benjamin	wants,	a	childhood	in	which	there	is	no	passage	of	time.	Time	here	is	converted	into	space.	This	is	why	there	is	no	narrative.	It	is	why,	except	in	the	most	attenuated	sense,	nothing	happens.	The	fragments	of	the	text	could	be	arranged	in	any	order	and	it	would	make	no	difference.	This	is	deepest	reason	why	there	is	no	final,	definitive	text:	such	a	text	could	not	exist	except	as	a	contingency	of	time	that	the	text	itself	aims	to	show	to	be	without	application.		The	spatial	arrangement	of	his	life	serves	a	very	specific	purpose	for	Benjamin.	For	it	is	a	way	of	marking	the	extraordinary	openness	that	the	world	has	for	a	child:	in	the	child’s	experience	of	the	world,	anything	might	be	possible	because	the	world	is	
open:	from	this	moment	in	the	child’s	life	any	number	of	possible	tracks	or	paths	lead	outwards	into	any	number	of	possible	futures.	The	world	is	thus	spatially	arranged	for	the	child.	Time	does	not	exist	for	him	as	something	by	which	he	is	burdened	or	weighed	down,	however	much	any	given	moment	might	be	filled	with	
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the	stagnation	of	time	that	is	boredom.7	The	spatiality	of	Benjamin’s	childhood	is,	as	we	shall	see,	central	to	the	redemption	it	seeks.		Key	to	Benjamin’s	conversion	of	time	into	space	is	the	materialism	this	text	manifests.	This	materialism	has	little	if	anything	to	do	with	the	kind	that	might	be	associated	with	Marxism	-	Benjamin	had	read	little	of	Marx,	anyway,	and	the	effect	on	him	of	reading	Marx,	when	he	did,	is	unclear,	as	many	commentators	have	noted.	Rather,	in	expelling	himself	into	the	material	world,	he	is	in	search	of	his	own	materiality,	what	D.H.	Lawrence	in	a	letter	of	5th	June	1914	to	Edward	Garnett	(Lawrence	1997,	78)	called	‘[t]hat	which	is	physic	–	non-human,	in	humanity’.	‘You	mustn’t	look	in	my	novel	for	the	old	stable	ego	–	of	character’,	Lawrence	goes	on.	
	 There	is	another	ego,	according	to	whose	action	the	individual	is	unrecognizable,	and	passes	through,	as	it	were,	allotropic	states	which	it	needs	a	deeper	sense	than	any	we’ve	been	used	to	exercise	to	discover	are	states	of	the	same	radically	unchanged	element.	(Like	as	diamond	and	coal	are	the	same	pure	single	element	of	carbon.	The	ordinary	novel	would	trace	the	history	of	diamond	–	but	I	say,	‘Diamond,	what!	This	is	carbon.’	And	my	diamond	might	be	coal	or	soot,	and	my	theme	is	carbon.)	
	It	is	as	if	Benjamin	wanted	to	discover	his	own	being	as	carbon,	as	an	element	at	one	with	the	material	world	from	which	all	is	composed.	The	thought	here	is	oddly	close	to	that	of	a	thinker	in	so	many	ways	profoundly	unlike	Lawrence,	namely,	Rilke,	who	certainly	had	a	direct	influence	on	Benjamin.	For	‘materialism’	here	also	means	a	deep	spirituality,	a	desire,	as	Rilke	has	it,	to	make	the	material	world	invisible	in	us	by	means	of	investing	ourselves	in	it,	and	it	in	us,	in	a	way	that	expresses	a	sense	of	its	magical,	sacred	quality.	He	explains	this	in	a	letter	of	13th	November	1925	to	his	Polish	translator,	Witold	von	Hulewicz	(Rilke	1963	[1923],	129):	
	 Even	for	our	grandparents	a	‘House,’	a	‘Well’	a	familiar	tower,	their	very	dress,	their	cloak,	was	infinitely	more,	infinitely	more	intimate	[than	for	us]:	almost	everything	a	vessel	in	which	they	found	and	stored	humanity…[T]he	house,	the	fruit,	the	grape	[were	things]	into	which	the	hope	and	meditation	of	our	forefathers	had	entered	.	.	.	The	animated,	experienced	things	that	SHARE	OUR	LIVES	are	coming	to	an	end	and	cannot	be	replaced.	WE	ARE	PERHAPS	THE	LAST	TO	HAVE	STILL	KNOWN	SUCH	THINGS	.	On	us	rests	the	responsibility	of	preserving,	not	merely	their	memory	(that	would	be	little	and	unreliable),	but	their	human	and	laral	worth.	(‘Laral’	in	the	sense	of	household-gods.)	
	In	this	text	of	Benjamin’s	a	search	for	the	materiality	of	the	self	is	of	a	piece	with	a	search	for	the	spirituality	of	things,	where	the	barriers	between	human	being	and	world,	the	spiritual	(or	metaphysical)	and	the	material,	are	broken	down	in	a	sacralising	move	that	expresses	a	sense	of	the	indissoluble	unity	of	things.		6.	But	there	is	a	further	reason	for	Benjamin’s	projection	of	himself	outwards	into	material	things,	events,	situations,	in	his	effacing	of	his	own	presence	in	the	peculiar	
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way	he	carries	this	out.	For	throughout	Kindheit	Benjamin	shows	himself	acutely	aware	of	what	one	might	call	a	decentered	or	displaced	conception	of	agency.	He	wishes	to	grasp	the	self	as	something	outside	itself,	as	a	point	at	which	social,	political,	cultural,	religious	traditions	come	together	and	meet	in	a	given	individual.	This	is	a	perspective	on	the	self	that	we	find	almost	impossible	to	take	up	in	ordinary	life.	From	the	inside,	the	forces	that	act	on	me	and	make	me	a	product	of	a	specific	kind	of	world	are	largely	invisible	to	me,	or	can	be	seen,	as	it	were,	only	sideways	on.	One	of	the	most	striking	facts	about	any	human	life	are	the	contingencies	of	politics,	tradition	and	the	like	that	make	it	what	it	is.	These	run	through	it	and	are	expressed	by	it,	yet	one’s	understanding	of	these	things	is	highly	elusive.	What	Benjamin	is	seeking	to	do	is	to	locate	himself	out	there,	show	himself,	his	agency,	his	identity	as	the	product	of	the	peculiar	circumstances	of	his	life	at	this	time	and	place.	He	is,	as	it	were,	trying	to	catch	the	self	as	it	evaporates	in	its	realisation	in	this	social	and	cultural	world.	This	is	a	central	reason	why	the	text	so	incessantly	deflects	knowledge	of	the	self	whilst	insisting	on	it	so	forcefully:	Benjamin,	this	individual,	is	most	emphatically,	unmistakeably	present,	and	yet,	at	the	same	time,	and	through	the	same	gesture,	absent,	dissolved	in	the	Umwelt	in	which	he	exists.	This,	I	think,	is	one	of	the	most	powerful	things	about	this	text,	making	it	so	seductive:	one	has	the	constant	sense	of	lagging	behind	Benjamin,	as	if	on	the	next	page	he	will	say	something	that	reveals	who	he	is	and	satisfy	one’s	curiosity.	But	the	moment	never	comes,	and	one	has	the	sense	that,	had	he	written	a	book	of	a	thousand	pages	on	his	childhood,	one	would	be	none	the	wiser.		Benjamin’s	strategy	here,	then,	expresses	a	particular	philosophical	conception	of	the	self.	But	it	also	expresses	certain	personal	concerns.	Central	amongst	these	is,	indeed,	something	that	is	a	product	of	the	particular	high	bourgeois	world	from	which	he	came	–	a	world	from	which	he	sought	to	liberate	himself	but,	as	he	makes	clear,	could	not:	he	describes	the	idea	of	repudiating	the	class	from	which	he	came	as	‘illusory’	(Benjamin	2006a,	93).	For	central	to	that	world	was	unquestionably	a	stiffness	and	formality	which	many	now	would	find	stifling	–	and	which	he	found	stifling.	But	he	also	felt	the	warmth	and	security	it	provided,	as	he	makes	abundantly	clear.	This	stiffness	thus	becomes	one	of	the	central	motivations	of	the	text,	animating	it	with	a	fear	of	a	being	known,	of	revealing	too	much,	even	as	the	whole	point	of	Benjamin’s	text	is	to	reveal	the	self.	That	is,	Benjamin	shows	himself	here	full	of	fear	and	desire:	the	fear	of	revealing	himself,	of	handing	himself	over	to	the	reader,	together	with	a	desire	to	do	so.	Or,	to	put	the	point	somewhat	differently:	Benjamin’s	text,	in	its	metaphysical	and	spiritual	ambitions,	in	its	incredible	
formality	of	style,	expresses	the	stiffness	of	the	bourgeois	world	from	which	he	came	and	which	he	needed,	as	much	as	he	loathed	it,	to	write	this	very	text:	bent	back	upon	itself,	Benjamin’s	memoir	rejects	that	from	which	it	feeds.			7.	Benjamin’s	text	is	multiply	layered	and	evasive,	circling	around	a	space	that	the	reader	will	often	suspect	to	be	empty	and	yet	seems	so	full,	such	is	the	density	of	the	work	and	the	sense	of	body	it	conveys.	Right	from	the	outset	the	book	announces	itself	as	an	exploration	of	Benjamin’s	childhood,	but	the	childhood	is	endlessly	and	explicitly	saturated	in	the	adult	Benjamin’s	thinking	and	longing;	the	self	is	
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projected	outwards	into	things	and	events,	and	these	things	are	projected	back	into	the	self,	and	thus	asks	to	be	known	and	resists	such	knowledge;	desire	is	satisfied	in	its	frustration;	the	time-bound,	limited	creature	is	rejected	in	favour	of	a	spatialised	subject	that	itself	evaporates.	And	throughout	this	there	is	a	sense	of	an	enchanted	place,	thick	and	heavy	with	the	body	and	the	world	of	existing	things,	each	such	thing	through	and	through	material	and	yet	metaphysically	significant.		This	is	highly	significant.	If,	as	I	have	suggested,	there	is	a	strategy	of	redemption	in	Benjamin’s	text,	then	it	is	clear	that	this	is	a	kind	of	redemption	that	cannot	be	fulfilled:	the	whole	text	speaks	of	a	search	for	it	that	fails.	I	do	not	think	that	this	is	incidental	to	Benjamin’s	purpose.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	just	what	he	wants.	This	is	because	the	overall	project	that	Benjamin	has	in	this	text	is	to	write	his	own	childhood	as	a	work	of	art.	And	the	text	inherits	aesthetic	strategies	of	modernism	and	Romanticism	in	doing	so.	I	can	begin	to	explain	what	I	mean	by	adverting	for	a	moment	to	a	defining	statement	of	such	an	aesthetic,	Joseph	Conrad’s	famous	preface	to	The	Nigger	of	the	‘Narcissus’	(Conrad,	1897).		One	would	like	to	quote	the	whole	of	Conrad’s	text,	so	rich	and	important	is	just	about	everything	said	in	it.	But	here	is	what	might	be	taken	to	be	its	central	idea:		 [A]rt	itself	may	be	defined	as	a	single-minded	attempt	to	render	the	highest	kind	of	justice	to	the	visible	universe,	by	bringing	to	light	the	truth,	manifold	and	one,	underlying	its	every	aspect.	It	is	an	attempt	to	find	in	its	forms,	in	its	colours,	in	its	light,	in	its	shadows,	in	the	aspects	of	matter	and	in	the	facts	of	life,	what	of	each	is	fundamental,	what	is	enduring	and	essential	—	their	one	illuminating	and	convincing	quality	—	the	very	truth	of	their	existence...[T]he	artist	descends	within	himself,	and	in	that	lonely	region	of	stress	and	strife…	appeals	to	that	part	of	our	being	which	is	not	dependent	on	wisdom:	to	that	in	us	which	is	a	gift	and	not	an	acquisition	—	and,	therefore,	more	permanently	enduring.	He	speaks	to	our	capacity	for	delight	and	wonder,	to	the	sense	of	mystery	surrounding	our	lives;	to	our	sense	of	pity,	and	beauty,	and	pain;	to	the	latent	feeling	of	fellowship	with	all	creation	—	and	to	the	subtle	but	invincible,	conviction	of	solidarity	that	knits	together	the	loneliness	of	innumerable	hearts:	to	the	solidarity	in	dreams,	in	joy,	in	sorrow,	in	aspirations,	in	illusions,	in	hope,	in	fear,	which	binds	men	to	each	other,	which	binds	together	all	humanity	—	the	dead	to	the	living	and	the	living	to	the	unborn.		For	many,	of	course,	in	the	contemporary	world,	this	kind	of	statement	will	appear	to	be	little	more	than	the	discredited	manifesto	of	one	who	has	been	overtaken	by	modernity’s	destruction	of	the	idea	that	art	has	anything	much	to	say	that	is	not	the	product	of	class	prejudice,	vested	interests	and	religious	sentiment	seeking	a	last	refuge	in	art	when	it	has	been	vanquished	on	its	own	territory.	But	the	fact	remains	that	it	does	a	great	deal	to	capture	for	many	a	sense	of	why	art	matters.	More	importantly,	I	suggest,	it	does	so	in	the	case	of	Benjamin.	Benjamin,	descending	within	himself,	seeks	to	render	justice	to	the	visible	universe	and,	in	doing	so,	to	find	
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the	truth	of	each	thing:	this	is	his	strategy	of	self-displacement	into	things	that	remains	faithful	to	them	as	they	are	and	yet	sees	in	them	a	significance	of	metaphysical	and	spiritual	import	that	reveals	their	truth,	their	truth	not	simply	as	the	things	of	his	life,	or	in	his	life,	but	also	their	truth	as	such,	behind	their	manifest	appearances.	Consider	one	further	example,	to	add	to	those	I	have	already	cited,	the	telephone,	a	new	arrival	in	the	home:		 Every	day	and	hour	the	telephone	was	my	twin	brother.	I	was	able	to	observe	how	it	left	behind	the	humiliations	of	its	first	years.	For,	when	the	chandelier,	fire	screen,	indoor	palm,	console	table,	guéridon	and	alcove	balustrade,	which	were	at	that	time	all	on	display	in	the	front	rooms,	were	long	ruined	and	moribund,	the	telephone,	like	a	legendary	hero	who	had	been	exposed	to	die	in	a	mountain	gulley,	leaving	the	dark	corridor	behind,	made	its	majestic	entry	into	the	light	and	bright	rooms,	now	occupied	by	the	younger	generation.	To	them,	it	was	a	consolation	for	their	loneliness.	To	those	without	hope,	who	wanted	to	leave	this	wicked	world,	it	winked	with	the	light	of	a	last	hope.	With	the	forsaken,	it	shared	a	bed.	(Benjamin	2006a,	18)		More	than	our	seeing	simply	an	account	of	what	the	telephone	meant	to	different	people,	we	sense	here	its	mythology,	a	persistent	attempt	to	penetrate	it	for	what	it	truly	is,	its	deepest	meaning.	And,	in	the	appeal	to	loneliness,	hopelessness,	forsakenness	we	see	that	appeal	to	the	conviction	of	solidarity	amongst	human	beings,	to	fellowship.	The	acute	tones	of	pain	and	joy	are	here	captured.		8.	Benjamin’s	text	of	his	childhood	as	a	work	of	art,	its	multi-layered	evasiveness,	and	its	attempt	to	penetrate	appearances	to	get	at	their	meaning,	at	what	‘is	fundamental,	what	is	enduring	and	essential	[in	them]	—	their	one	illuminating	and	convincing	quality	—	the	very	truth	of	their	existence’,	are	mutually	supportive	strategies.	For	what	Conrad	suggests	in	his	preface	is	that	art	has	a	special	place	in	revealing	the	truth	of	human	existence.	This	is	clearly	what	Conrad	means	in	speaking	of	‘art…as	a	single-minded	attempt	to	render	the	highest	kind	of	justice	to	the	visible	universe,	by	bringing	to	light	the	truth,	manifold	and	one,	underlying	its	every	aspect’.			Now,	as	Sebastian	Gardner	(2014,	245-48)	has	pointed	out	very	forcefully,	how	art	does	this	and	what	exactly	it	reveals	remains	resistant	to	complete	articulation	or	comprehension.	Many	artists	and	philosophers	have,	of	course,	sought	to	capture	the	experience	we	have	when	confronted	by	a	work	of	art	that	seems	to	offer	just	the	kind	of	illumination	of	which	Conrad	speaks.	But	what	is	revealed	by	such	a	work	of	art	remains	opaque	to	full	comprehension	even	if	the	experience	in	question	demands	recognition	in	its	own	terms.	Further,	the	peculiar	arrangement	of	the	work	of	art	–	its	specific	relation	of	form	and	content,	for	example	-	that	seems	to	offer	such	understanding	as	is	in	question	is	clearly	central	to	how	a	work	of	art	reveals	what	it	reveals,	but,	once	again,	we	do	not	fully	understand	or	grasp	how	that	is	so:	pretty	much	most	of	what	we	say	about	the	relation	of	form	and	content	in	a	work	of	art	strikes	us	as	banal,	as	failing	to	capture	the	experience	that	
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motivates	such	speech.	Works	of	art	always	return	us	to	themselves	as	we	are	struck	by	a	need	to	go	back	to	them	again	and	again,	as	if	we	hoped	or	supposed	that	one	more	viewing	or	reading	or	listening	might	enable	us	to	grasp	in	discursive	terms,	finally,	just	what	it	is	that	the	work	reveals	and	how	it	does	this.	This	is	the	characteristic	hunger	that	one	can	have	for	given	works	of	art.		Now,	if	Benjamin’s	Kindheit	is	a	work	of	art,	as	I	am	suggesting	it	is,	we	have	a	better	understanding	of	its	evasiveness.	For	Benjamin’s	strategy	here	is	consonant	with	that	which	is	typical	of	works	of	modernism	where	there	is	a	relentless	search	not	only	to	reveal	the	truth	of	things,	but	also,	and	at	the	same	time,	to	subject	to	interrogation	the	elusiveness	of	our	understanding	of	both	what	that	truth	is	that	might	be	revealed	and	how	it	is	that	a	work	of	art	can	reveal	it.	In	other	words,	typical	modernist	works	of	art	explore	their	own	condition	even	as,	and	because	they,	explore	the	world:	this	is	their	characteristic	self-consciousness.8	Benjamin’s	account	of	his	childhood	thus	locates	itself	in	the	modernism	of	literary	works	of	art.	Its	being	an	autobiography	of	a	childhood	and	its	refusal	of	this	condition;	its	account	of	desire	as	fulfilled	in	its	frustration;	its	spatialisation	of	the	subject	in	its	projection	into	the	material	world:	these	all	are	key	to	its	struggle	to	locate	the	truth	of	the	world,	its	inability	to	do	this	and	its	knowledge	that	this	is	its	condition.	And	central	to	this	is	its	outstanding	feature	as	a	work	of	art,	namely,	that	intoxicated,	dream-like,	magical	experience	it	expresses	and	evokes	in	the	reader.		The	redemption	that	is	sought	in	this	text	is	thus	forever	elusive.	But	this	is	not	a	failure	of	the	text,	as	if	Benjamin	might	have	secured	the	redemption	he	sought	if	only	he	had	got	things	right.	On	the	contrary,	Benjamin’s	strategy	has	an	important	implication	for	the	truth	of	a	life,	as	it	has,	as	we	have	seen,	for	the	truth	of	the	world.	It	is	as	if	he	were	saying	to	us:	the	truth	of	a	life	is	always	just	out	of	reach,	exists	just	there,	over	the	horizon	of	all	the	individual	events	and	moments	of	the	life.	Final	redemption	would	be	to	grasp	that	truth,	but	the	failure	to	do	so	is	not	some	limitation	on	any	given	individual	person,	some	error	from	which	someone	or	other	might	be	free	or	liberated.	It	is,	rather,	a	condition	of	living	a	human	life,	a	necessary	limitation	on	such	existence.	To	live	a	human	life	is	always	to	have	a	sense	that	there	is	some	truth	about	that	life,	but	one	can	neither	reach	it	nor	give	up	the	attempt	to	do	so.		What	does	truth	mean	here?	Central	here	is,	I	think,	as	Pascal	explored	so	magnificently,	the	notion	of	distraction.	We	all	spend	our	lives	in	a	relentless	quest	to	service	the	demands	of	the	self,	to	provide	what	we	suppose	ourselves	to	need,	to	shore	up	the	flagging	ego	through	strategies	of	vanity	or	greed	that	we	dignify	as	justified	self-concern.	Yet	there	can	be	moments	in	which	all	that	falls	away	and	we	see	ourselves	for	what	we	are	and	can	suppose,	perhaps,	that	we	could	live	in	the	light	of	that.	But	we	cannot	for,	were	we	per	impossibile	to	do	so,	we	could	no	longer	exist,	for	the	world	is	such	that	this	stillness	and	self-knowledge	is	unliveable:	we	could	no	longer,	so	to	speak,	fend	for	ourselves	were	we	to	try	to	live	in	this	way.		
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All	this	is	said	better	by	Pascal	than	I	can	say	it.	But	an	example	may	help.	It	concerns	the	reaction	of	a	friend	of	mine	to	the	film	The	English	Surgeon,	a	documentary	about	the	brain	surgeon	Henry	Marsh	who	travelled	regularly	to	the	Ukraine	where	he	sought	to	help	an	endless	stream	of	patients	suffering	from	brain	tumours	and	the	like,	and	who,	without	him,	would	have	had	little	if	any	access	to	the	kind	of	healthcare	that	many	of	us,	lucky	enough	to	live	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	take	for	granted.	The	suffering	by	which	Marsh	was	confronted,	and	its	hopelessness	at	that	time	and	place,	would	cause	a	scandal	in,	say,	the	UK,	where,	for	all	the	failures	that	are	inevitable	in	the	system	of	healthcare,	we	can	take	it	that	such	suffering	will	be	attended	to	–	whereas	in	the	Ukraine,	as	depicted	in	this	film,	the	radical	maiming	of	human	lives	is	accepted	with	a	resignation	that	locates	it	as	simply	the	luck	of	the	draw	in	which	there	are	bound	to	be	losers.	This	thought	is	alien	to	the	whole	premise	of	the	UK	system	of	healthcare.	My	friend	said	that	watching	this	film	should	change	one’s	life.	But	it	would	not.	He	meant	that	the	film	
places	our	egoism,	our	banality	and	triviality,	our	caring	about	things	that	do	not	matter,	and	we	know	do	not	matter.	For	sure,	we	can	grow	to	be	less	prey	to	such	things,	but	we	cannot	live	without	them,	because	the	endless	push	of	the	world	on	us	makes	this	impossible:	we	have	to	push	back	to	survive	and	‘get	on’,	and	forms	of	banality,	stupidity	and	triviality	are	inevitable	in	this.	Yet	the	truth	of	a	life	would	be	that	which	we	see	when	we	see	beyond	all	that	-	and	to	live	in	its	light.	Or,	more	exactly,	the	truth	would	be	what	we	see	of	our	own	individual	forms	of	banality	in	the	light	of	that	truth.	But	we	cannot	live	accordingly,	because	we	must	assume	what	Virginia	Woolf	calls	‘the	burden	of	individual	life’:	the	truth	of	a	life	is	beyond	that	burden	in	its	perfect	emptiness,	freed	from	that	burden,	together	with	what	that	emptiness	shows	up	about	my	life.9			We	could	put	things	this	way.	Any	given	life,	I	said,	is,	at	its	outset,	an	experience	of	the	spatial	openness	of	the	world.	Time	does	not	yet	exist	for	the	child	as	something	with	which	he	is	burdened	and	the	world	exists	before	him	as	a	scene	of	possibilities	that	lead	out	from	childhood	into	later	life.	As	we	grow	older,	we	exchange	space	for	time,	become	filled	with	time	and	lose	the	world	as	a	theatre	of	space.	Though	from	a	natural	scientific	point	of	view	it	is	true	that	we	live	in	space	and	time	equally	so	from	the	moment	of	birth	until	death,	from	a	phenomenological	point	of	view	this	is	not	so:	we	live,	rather,	in	space	and	come	to	live	less	there	and	more	in	time.	This	is	one	reason	for	the	poignancy	and	innocence	of	children:	they	are	innocent	since	they	are	still	only	in	space,	barely	entered	upon	time,	and	thus	unburdened	as	the	adult	must	be.	That	space	is	emptiness:	the	burden	of	individual	life	is	the	burden	of	time	and	its	demands	on	us	as	we	grow.			9.	Benjamin,	we	can	say,	offers	us	a	distinctly	post-humanist	ethic.	This	is	precisely	because	his	conception	of	the	subject	is	one	that	is	profoundly	elusive	to	itself	and	is	continuous	with	a	world	both	material	and	spiritual.	There	is	no	conception	here	of	the	subject	as	an	autonomous,	self-knowing	locus	of	agency,	in	control	of	itself	and	it	environment.	Contingency	is	central	here.	Childhood	offers	Benjamin	the	perfect	vehicle	for	this	ethic	precisely	because	the	child	is	so	deeply	absorbed	in	his	world,	in	the	world,	as	I	have	sought	to	bring	out.	Underlying	Benjamin’s	approach	is	the	
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thought	that,	as	adults,	we	live	in	a	kind	of	fantasy	in	which	we	have	become	masters	of	our	own	lives,	however	much	we	know,	somewhere,	somehow,	that	this	is,	indeed,	an	illusion.	We	are	material	through	and	through,	possessed	of	a	sacred	materiality	that	is	characteristic	too	of	the	world	that	surrounds	us,	the	world	of	the	things,	plants	and	animals.	It	is	the	way	in	which	this	unity	is	evoked	in	Benjamin’s	text	that	gives	it	its	acute	beauty,	makes	it	revelatory	of	our	lives	as	only	a	work	of	art	can	be.	There	is	a	kind	of	tragic	affirmation	in	Benjamin’s	outlook,	the	tragedy	coming	from	a	sense	of	our	own	extraordinary	frailty	as	part	of	the	material	world,	the	affirmation	from	the	possibility	that	this	opens	up	a	particular	kind	of	love	of	things	in	our	closeness	to	them.	And	yet	even	here	our	absorption	in	the	world	is	fractured,	as	is	evidenced	by	the	evasiveness	of	Benjamin’s	text.	It	is	as	if	he	wanted	to	say:	we	are	at	one	with	the	world,	but	we	cannot	fully	live	this	and	cannot	fully	believe	this.	The	tragic	love	of	the	world	that	Benjamin’s	text	intimates	and	for	which	he	searches,	which	he	wants,	finally	eludes	him.	Even	childhood,	for	Benjamin,	is	lived	in	a	state	of	emergency.		References		Améry,	Jean	1994	[1968].	On	Ageing.		Translated	by	J.D.	Barlow.	Bloomington	Indiana:	Indiana	University	Press.	Benjamin,	Walter	1979	[1928]	One-Way	Street	and	Other	Writings.	Translated	by		Edmund	Jephcott	and	Kingsley	Shorter.	London:	Harcourt	Brace	Jovanovich.	Benjamin,	Walter	2006a	[1987].	Berliner	Kindheit	um	1900.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp.	Benjamin,	Walter	2006b.	Berlin	Childhood	Around	1900.	Translated	by	Howard	Eiland.	Cambridge,	Massachusetts.	Benjamin,	Walter	2007	[1955].	Illuminations.	Translated	by	Harry	Zohn.	Edited	and	introduced	by	Hannah	Arendt.	Preface	by	Leon	Wieseltier.	Benjamin,	Walter	2016	[1932].	Berliner	Chronik,	edited	by	Karl-Maria	Guth.	Berlin:	Contumax.	Conrad,	Joseph	1897,	preface	to	The	Nigger	of	the	‘Narcissus’.	https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/conrad/joseph/c75nn/preface.html,	last	accessed	3	December	2017.	Finkelde,	Dominik	2009	‘The	Presence	of	the	Baroque’.	In	A	Companion	to	the	Works	
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